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Abstract
We present ABETS, an assertion-based, dynamic analyzer that helps diagnose errors in Maude programs.
ABETS uses slicing to automatically create reduced versions of both a run’s execution trace and executed
program, reduced versions in which any information that is not relevant to the bug currently being diagnosed
is removed. In addition, ABETS employs runtime assertion checking to automate the identification of bugs
so that whenever an assertion is violated, the system automatically infers accurate slicing criteria from the
failure. We summarize the main services provided by ABETS, which also include a novel assertion-based
facility for program repair that generates suitable program fixes when a state invariant is violated. Finally,
we provide an experimental evaluation that shows the performance and effectiveness of the system. This
paper is under consideration for publication in TPLP.
KEYWORDS: Runtime Assertion Checking, Dynamic Program and Trace Slicing, Program Diagnosis and
Debugging, Rewriting Logic, Maude
1 Introduction
Bug diagnosis is a time-consuming and, most often, tedious manual task that forces developers
to painstakingly examine large volumes of complex execution traces while trying to locate the
actual cause of observable misbehaviors. This paper describes a dynamic program analyzer called
ABETS (“Assertion-BasEd Trace Slicer”), which aims to mitigate the costs of diagnosing errors
in concurrent programs that are written in Maude.
Maude is a language and a system that efficiently implements Rewriting Logic (RWL) (Mese-
guer 1992), which is a logic of change that seamlessly unifies a wide variety of models of concur-
rency. Thanks to its logical basis, Maude provides a precise mathematical model, which allows
it to be used as a declarative language and as a formal verification system. Maude supports rich
formal specification, equational rewriting, and logical reasoning modulo algebraic axioms (such
as associativity, commutativity, and identity), providing tools for a number of formal techniques
that include theorem proving, protocol analysis, state space exploration, deductive verification,
model transformation, constraint solving, and model checking. The execution traces generated
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and by Generalitat Valenciana PROMETEOII/2015/013. J. Sapiña was supported by FPI-UPV grant SP2013-0083.
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by Maude are complex objects to analyze since they may contain a huge number of compound
rewrite steps that, however, omit crucial information for debugging such as the application of al-
gebraic axioms (which is concealed within Maude’s equational matching algorithm). While this
maximizes efficiency and is certainly justified during the program operation, it further compli-
cates debugging. The dynamic analyzer ABETS described in this paper facilitates the debugging
of Maude programs. It does this by drastically simplifying the size and complexity of the an-
alyzed programs and runs while still showing all relevant information for debugging, which is
done by a fruitful combination of runtime assertion checking and slicing that was originally for-
malized in (Alpuente et al. 2016). In assertion-based slicing, the user supplements the Maude
program to be analyzed with a set of logical assertions that are checked at runtime. Upon an
assertion failure, an accurate set of discordant positions (called symptoms) is automatically cal-
culated byABETS by comparing the computed erroneous program state with the expected pattern
for the state (as defined by the violated assertion), with the comparison being performed by us-
ing least general generalization modulo the algebraic axioms of the operators involved (Alpuente
et al. 2014). By filtering out everything but the distilled disagreements, a so-called slicing crite-
rion is synthesized by ABETS that accurately identifies the (position of the) faulty information in
the erroneous last state of the trace. Then, in order to locate the source of the error, a trace slicing
procedure is automatically triggered that propagates the anomalous information. This is done by
recursively computing the origins or antecedents (Field and Tip 1994) of the observed positions
while removing everything but the computed antecedents at each step. The given combination
of runtime checking and slicing yields a self-initiating, enhanced dynamic slicing technique that
traverses the program execution and makes every single computation detail explicit while reveal-
ing only and all data in the trace that contribute to the criterion observed. As a by-product of the
trace slicing process, an executable program slice is also automatically extracted that captures
the program subset that is concerned with the error.
Assertion-based slicing is efficiently implemented in ABETS not just for Maude, but also for
Full Maude (Clavel et al. 2007), which is a powerful extension of Maude that provides support for
object-oriented specification and advanced module operations. The major strength of the system
is that the user needs not identify criteria or error symptoms in advance because the assertions (or
more precisely, their runtime checks) are used to synthesize the slicing criteria. This is a signif-
icant improvement over more traditional, hand-operated slicing in which the criteria for slicing
need to be provided by the user.
Contributions. The basic algorithms behind ABETS were introduced in (Alpuente et al. 2016),
where we evaluated them on a prototype implementation of the system. This work describes the
latest, fully-fledged ABETS implementation, which improves system efficiency as well as the
generality/flexibility of the overall technique.
• We explain the functionality of ABETS in Section 3. In Section 3.1, we describe the
assertion-based trace slicing facility. In Section 3.2, we outline a new repair technique
that automatically suggests program corrections to fix the program faults that are signalled
by the violation of a state invariant property. The corrected rules are guarded by a suitable
instance of the invariant so that the repaired rule is fired only if the invariant is fulfilled.
In Section 3.3, we present some novel extra analysis features that complement the ABETS
core functionality.
• We provide a description of those novel implementation details and optimizations that have
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boosted the system performance in Section 4. Also, we report a new in-depth experimental
evaluation of the system in Section 5 that assesses critical aspects such as the assertion-
checking and slicing capabilities, and the system input/output performance, which is a
usual weak spot of tools developed in (Full) Maude.
• The ABETS system is available at http://safe-tools.dsic.upv.es/abets. It can be
downloaded and locally installed as a stand-alone console application, or it can be remotely
used via a user-friendly web interface. A brief discussion of related tools and concluding
remarks are provided in Section 6.
2 Modeling Concurrent Systems in Maude: Our Running Example
Concurrent systems can be formalized through Maude programs. A Maude program essentially
consists of two components, E and R, where E is a canonical (membership) equational theory
that models system states as terms of an algebraic data type, and R is a set of rewrite rules that de-
fine transitions between states. Algebraic structures often involve axioms like associativity (A),
commutativity (C), and/or identity (a.k.a unity) (U) of function symbols, which cannot be han-
dled by ordinary term rewriting but instead are handled implicitly by working with congruence
classes of terms. This is why the membership equational theory E is decomposed into a disjoint
union E = ∆unionmultiAx, where the set ∆ consists of (conditional) equations and membership axioms
(i.e., axioms that assert the type or sort of some terms) that are implicitly oriented from left to
right as rewrite rules (and operationally used as simplification rules), and Ax is a set of algebraic
axioms, implicitly expressed as function attributes, that are only used for Ax-matching.
The concurrent system evolves by rewriting states using equational rewriting, i.e., rewrit-
ing with the rewrite rules in R modulo the equations and axioms in E (Meseguer 1992). More
precisely, execution traces (i.e., system computations) correspond to rewrite sequences t0
r0−→E
t1
r1−→E . . ., where t r−→E t ′ denotes a transition (modulo E) from state t to t ′ via the rewrite rule
of R that is uniquely labeled with r. Assuming that the initial term t is normalized (this assump-
tion is not essential, but it will simplify the exposition), each single transition t r−→E t ′ (or Maude
step) is computed as a rewrite chain t r−→ t ′′→∗∆ (t ′′↓∆) = t ′, where t ′′→∗∆ (t ′′↓∆) is an equational
simplification sequence that rewrites t ′′ into its canonical (i.e., irreducible) form (t ′′↓∆) using the
oriented equations in ∆. Although advisedly omitted in our notation, all rewrites in the chain
(either applying r or any of the equations in ∆) are performed modulo Ax. When a rewrite step
from term t to term t ′ via a rule r ∈ R must be fully characterized, we will write t r,σ ,w−→ t ′ where
w is the position in t where the rewrite occurred and σ is the computed substitution obtained
by pattern matching modulo E. As usual, term positions are defined by means of sequences of
natural numbers (Λ denotes the empty sequence, i.e., the root position). The result of replacing
the subterm of t at position w by the term s is denoted by t[s]w.
The following Maude program will be used as a running example throughout the paper.
Example 2.1
Let us introduce a (faulty) rewrite theory that specifies a simplified1 stock exchange concurrent
system, in which traders operate on stocks via limit orders, that is, orders that set the upper bound
(price limit) at which traders want to buy stocks.
1 Maude’s syntax is hopefully self-explanatory. Due to space limitations and for the sake of clarity, we only highlight
those details of the system that are relevant to this work. A complete Maude specification of the stock exchange model
is available at the ABETS website at http://safe-tools.dsic.upv.es/abets.
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When the stock price equals or drops below the price limit L, the associated order is opened
and the trader buys the stocks at the current stock price. An order is automatically closed and the
associated stocks are sold either (a) when the stock price P exceeds the purchase price limit L plus
a predetermined profit target PT (i.e., P− L ≥ PT), or (b) when L− P exceeds a predetermined
stop loss SL (i.e., L−P≥ SL).
eq [prefT] : PreferredTraders = ’T2 .
cmb [premT] : tr(TID,C) : PremiumTrader if TID in PreferredTraders .
rl [next-rnd] : R : SS | TS | OS => R + 1 : updP(R+1,reSeed(R+1),SS) | TS | OS .
crl [open-ord] :
R : (st(SID,P),SS) | (tr(TID,C),TS) | (ord(OID,TID,SID,L,PT,SL,closed),OS) =>
R : (st(SID,P),SS) | (tr(TID,C - P),TS) | (ord(OID,TID,SID,L,PT,SL,open),OS)
if P <= L .
crl [close-ord-SL] :
R : (st(SID,P),SS) | (tr(TID,C),TS) | (ord(OID,TID,SID,L,PT,SL,open),OS) =>
R : (st(SID,P),SS) | (tr(TID,C + P),TS) | OS
if P <= L - SL .
crl [close-ord-PT] :
R : (st(SID,P),SS) | (tr(TID,C),TS) | (ord(OID,TID,SID,L,PT,SL,open),OS) =>
R : (st(SID,P),SS) | (tr(TID,C + P),TS) | OS
if P >= L + PT .
eq [updP] : updP(R,S,(st(SID,P),SS)) =
if (rndDelta(R * S) rem 2) == 0
then st(SID,S + rndDelta(R * S)),updP(R,S + 1,SS)
else st(SID,S - rndDelta(R * S)),updP(R,S + 1,SS)
fi .
eq [updP-owise] : updP(R,S,empty) = empty [owise] .
Fig. 1. (Conditional) rewrite rules and equations modeling the stock exchange system.
Within our system model, variable names are fully capitalized, while names that begin with
the symbol ’ are constant identifiers for traders, stocks and orders. System states have the form
R : SS | TS | OS, where R is a natural number (called round) that models the market time
evolution, and SS, TS, and OS are sets2 of stocks, traders, and orders, respectively.
Stocks are modeled as terms st(SID,P) with SID being the stock identifier and P being the
current stock price. Traders are modeled as tr(TID,C), where TID is the trader identifier and C is
the trader’s available capital. We consider two classes of traders: premium traders and ordinary
(or non-premium) traders. Premium traders are allowed to buy even if they run out of capital.
Premium traders are identified by the conditional membership axiom premT (see Figure 1) that
simply checks whether the trader identifier belongs to the (hard-coded) list PreferredTraders,
which in this example just contains the premium trader ’T2.
Orders are specified by terms of the form ord(OID,TID,SID,L,PT,SL,ST), which record
the order identifier OID, the trader identifier TID, the stock identifier SID, the stock price limit
L, the profit target PT, the stop loss SL, and the order status ST (which can be either open or
closed). For simplicity, an order allows only a single stock to be traded at a time. This is not a
limitation since multiple stocks can be managed by multiple orders.
Basic operations of the stock exchange model (i.e., market time evolution, opening and closure
2 To specify sets of X-typed elements, we instantiate the Maude parameterized sort Set{X}, which defines sets as
associative, commutative, and idempotent lists of elements that is simply written as (e1, . . . ,en). The empty set is
denoted by the constant symbol empty.
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of orders) are implemented via the rules and equations of Figure 1. The open-ord rule opens
a trader order only if the stock price P falls below or is equal to the order price limit L. When
the order is opened, the stock price is subtracted from the trader’s capital, thereby updating the
capital. Note that, in the set of stocks (st(SID,P),SS), the stock st(SID,P) is distinguished from
all other stocks SS in the system.
Similarly, the close-ord-SL rule closes an order for the stock SID and removes it from the
current state when the SID stock price P falls below or is equal to the L−SL stop loss threshold.
The trader’s capital then increases by the price P that the trader gets for the sold stocks. The
close-ord-PT rule is similar and closes an order when its stock price satisfies the profit target.
Finally, the next-rnd rule models the time evolution by simply increasing the round number
by one and then automatically updating the stock prices by means of the function updP, which
randomly increases or decreases the stock prices via the naïve pseudo-random number generator
rndDelta that is re-seeded at the beginning of each round with the round tick R+1.
Note that the specification given in Figure 1 contains two sources of error. First, the function
updP is flawed because it could generate non-positive stock prices, which are meaningless and
should be disallowed. Second, the rule open-ord does not check if the available capital of a non-
premium trader is enough to cover the order price limit. For instance, for the ordinary Trader ’T,
the following reachability goal (which can be solved in Maude via the search command3)
(1 : st(’S,8) | tr(’T,9) | ord(’O,’T,’S,12,4,3,closed)) =>* R : SS | tr(’T,C) | OS .
computes (among other solutions) the substitution {R/3, SS/st(’S, 12), C/-3, OS/ord(’O,
’T, ’S, 12, 4, 3, open)} that witnesses the existence of an execution trace that starts from
the specified initial state and ends in a final state with a faulty, negative capital C=-3.
3 Assertion-based Program Analysis and Repair with ABETS
ABETS implements an automated trace slicing technique based on (Alpuente et al. 2014) that
facilitates the analysis of Maude programs by drastically reducing the size and complexity of
entangled, textually-large execution traces. The technique first uncovers data dependences within
the execution trace T w.r.t. a slicing criterion (i.e., a set of selected symbols in the last state of
T ) and then produces a trace slice T • of T in which pointless information that is detected to
be irrelevant w.r.t. the chosen criterion (i.e., symbols in T that are not origins or antecedents of
the observed symbols) is replaced with the special variable symbol •.
Unlike the original trace slicing methodology of (Alpuente et al. 2014) where the slicing cri-
terion must be manually determined in advance by the user, ABETS encompasses a runtime
assertion-checking mechanism (which is built on top of the slicing engine) that was originally
formalized in (Alpuente et al. 2016) and preserves the program semantics. This mechanism al-
lows the slicing criteria to be automatically inferred from falsified assertions, thereby offering
more automatic support to the analysis of erroneous programs and traces.
The slicing algorithm employs unification to implement the origin-tracking procedure that
3 Given a (possibly) non-ground term s, Maude’s search command checks whether a reduct of t is an instance (modulo
the program equations and axioms) of s and delivers the corresponding (equational) matcher as the computed solution.
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properly tracks back the data dependences along the trace, and the generalization (i.e., anti-
unification) algorithm modulo axioms of (Alpuente et al. 2014) to automatically identify seman-
tic disagreements of the program behavior w.r.t. the assertions (Alpuente et al. 2016).
ABETS is also provided with an automatic program repair facility, which is described in Sec-
tion 3.2, that suggests fixes to potentially buggy rewrite rules whenever it detects a faulty system
state of a traceT that does not satisfy a system assertion S{ϕ}. Roughly speaking, the technique
transforms the rewrite rule that is responsible for the system assertion failure (i.e., the last applied
rule in T that causes (a piece of) the transformed state to match the state pattern S). This fix is
done by adding a constrained instance of the logic formula ϕ into the conditional part of the rule,
which is computed by using Maude’s built-in E-unification (Durán et al. 2016).
3.1 Assertion-based Slicing in ABETS
ABETS supports two types of assertions: system assertions and functional assertions.
i) System assertions: Their general syntax is S{ϕ}, where S is a term (called state template), and
ϕ is a logic formula in conjunctive normal form ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕn.
A system assertion S{ϕ} defines a state invariant that must be satisfied by all system states
that match (modulo the equational theory E) the state template S. When a system state s does
not satisfy a system assertion S{ϕ}, the position p in s, which is called bug position, precisely
indicates the subterm of s that matches S and is responsible for the assertion violation.
Example 3.1
The following system assertion specifies that the capital of ordinary traders must be non-negative
in every system state of the trace:
R:Nat : SS:Set{Stock} | tr(TID:TraderID,C:Int),TS:Set{Trader} | OS:Set{Order}
{ordinary(tr(TID:TraderID,C:Int)) implies C:Int >= 0}
where the user-specified predicate ordinary(T) simply checks whether T is a non-premium
trader in the Maude program of Example 2.1.
ii) Functional assertions: Their general form is I {ϕin} → O {ϕout} where I,O are terms, and
ϕin,ϕout are logic formulas. Intuitively, functional assertions specify pre- and post-conditions
over the equational simplification t →∗∆ (t↓∆) that heads the rewriting t
r−→E t ′ of any term t in
the system trace by providing: (i) an input template I that t can match and a pre-condition ϕin
that t can meet; (ii) an output template O that the canonical form (t↓∆) of t has to match and a
post-condition ϕout that (t↓∆) has to meet (whenever the input term t matching I meets ϕin).
Example 3.2
Consider again the Maude program of Example 2.1. The functional assertion
updP(R:Nat,S:Nat,(st(SID:StockID, P:Int),SS:Set{Stock})) { P:Int > 0 }
-> (st(SID:StockID, P’:Int),SS’:Set{Stock}) { P’:Int > 0 }
specifies that stock market fluctuations modeled by function updP should generate positive stock
prices provided that the input stock prices are also positive.
The satisfiability of the provided assertions can be checked in two different modalities, either
as a synchronous (and trace-storing) procedure that incrementally executes, checks, and poten-
tially slices execution traces at runtime, or as an asynchronous (off-line) procedure that processes
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a previously computed execution trace against the set of provided assertions. In ABETS, system
traces can be easily generated by providing both an initial and a final reachable state. As for equa-
tional simplification traces, they can be generated by simply providing the initial term, which is
then simplified to its irreducible form.
Synchronous as well as asynchronous assertion checking is implemented via equational rewrit-
ing that automatically reduces all matched assertions to Boolean truth values.
Example 3.3
Consider the Maude program of Example 2.1 and the execution traceT = s0
next-rnd−→ s1 open-ord−→ s2
that starts in the initial state
s0 = 1 : (st(’S1,23), st(’S2,8)) | (tr(’T1,9), tr(’T2,20)) | ord(’O1,’T1,’S2,12,4,3,closed)
and ends in the state
s2 = 2 : (st(’S1,4), st(’S2,12)) | (tr(’T1,-3), tr(’T2,20)) | ord(’O1,’T1,’S2,12,4,3,open)
The negative capital of the ordinary trader ’T1 in the state s2 is demonstrably wrong by the
violation of the system assertion of Example 3.1. Hence, ABETS automatically computes the
slicing criterion tr(’T1,-3) that pinpoints this faulty information and produces the trace slice
T • of Figure 2, which represents a partial view of the system evolution that focuses on T1’s
trading actions and exposes the erroneous behaviour of the open-ord rule to user inspection.
1 : st(• ,• ),st(• ,• ) | tr(’T1,9),• | (ord(• ,’T1,• ,12,• ,• ,closed))
next-rnd•→ • : • ,st(• ,12)) | tr(’T1,9),• | ord(• ,’T1,• ,12,• ,• ,closed)
open-ord•→ • : • | tr(’T1,-3),• | •
Fig. 2. Trace slice for automatically synthesized criterion tr(’T1,-3).
ABETS also provides a handy way to automatically synthesize refined slicing criteria by means
of special variables (whose name begins with ]) that can be used in the assertions to indicate
pieces of the matched term that the user does not want to observe along the generated trace
slice. For instance, if we replace TID:TraderID with ]TID:TraderID in the system assertion
of Example 3.1, we compute the refined criterion tr(•,-3) for the trace T of Example 3.3.
3.2 Automatic Repair of Program Rules in ABETS
Given an equational theory E = ∆∪Ax and two terms t1 and t2, an E-unifier for t1 and t2 is a
substitution σ such that t1σ =E t2σ . In Maude, E-unifiers are not represented as a single sub-
stitution, but as a pair of substitutions (σ1,σ2), one for left unificands and the other for right
unificands (i.e., t1σ1 =E t2σ2). Also, Maude’s E-unification algorithm may generate new (fresh)
unification variables, denoted by %n, with n being a natural number. The set of all such variables
contained in a given term t is denoted by UnifVar(t). Let us see an example.
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×Trace information (trusted mode)
State Label Original trace Sliced trace
1 'Start updP(1 + 2, reSeed(1 + 2), (st('S1, 4),st('S2, 12))) updP(1 + 2, reSeed(1 + 2), (st(•, •),st(•, •)))
2 builtIn updP(3, reSeed(1 + 2), (st('S1, 4),st('S2, 12))) updP(3, reSeed(1 + 2), (st(•, •),st(•, •)))
3 builtIn updP(3, reSeed(3), (st('S1, 4),st('S2, 12))) updP(3, reSeed(3), (st(•, •),st(•, •)))
4 re­seed updP(3, 3 + 3, (st('S1, 4),st('S2, 12))) updP(3, 3 + 3, (st(•, •),st(•, •)))
5 builtIn updP(3, 6, (st('S1, 4),st('S2, 12))) updP(3, 6, (st(•, •),st(•, •)))
6 fromBnf updP(3, 6, (st('S2, 12),st('S1, 4))) updP(3, 6, (st(•, •),st(•, •)))
7 updP
if rndDelta(3 * 6) rem 2 == 0 then st('S1, 6 + rndDelta(3 * 6)),updP(3, 6 + 1, st('S2, 
12)) else st('S1, 6 + ­ rndDelta(3 * 6)),updP(3, 6 + 1, st('S2, 12)) fi
if rndDelta(3 * 6) rem 2 == 0 then •,updP(3, 6 + 1, st(•, •)) else • fi
8 builtIn
if rndDelta(18) rem 2 == 0 then st('S1, 6 + rndDelta(3 * 6)),updP(3, 6 + 1, st('S2, 12
)) else st('S1, 6 + ­ rndDelta(3 * 6)),updP(3, 6 + 1, st('S2, 12)) fi
if rndDelta(18) rem 2 == 0 then •,updP(3, 6 + 1, st(•, •)) else • fi
34 rnd­delta
st('S1, 10),if random(21) rem 10 rem 2 == 0 then st('S2, 7 + random(21) rem 10),up
dP(3, 7 + 1, empty) else st('S2, 7 + ­ rndDelta(21)),updP(3, 7 + 1, empty) fi
•,if random(21) rem 10 rem 2 == 0 then • else st(•, 7 + ­ rndDelta(21)),• fi
35 rnd­delta
st('S1, 10),if random(21) rem 10 rem 2 == 0 then st('S2, 7 + random(21) rem 10),up
dP(3, 7 + 1, empty) else st('S2, 7 + ­ (random(21) rem 10)),updP(3, 7 + 1, empty) fi
•,if random(21) rem 10 rem 2 == 0 then • else st(•, 7 + ­ (random(21) rem 10
)),• fi
36 builtIn
st('S1, 10),if 3488238119 rem 10 rem 2 == 0 then st('S2, 7 + random(21) rem 10),up
dP(3, 7 + 1, empty) else st('S2, 7 + ­ (random(21) rem 10)),updP(3, 7 + 1, empty) fi
•,if 3488238119 rem 10 rem 2 == 0 then • else st(•, 7 + ­ (random(21) rem 10)),• fi
50 builtIn st('S1, 10),st('S2, ­2),updP(3, 8, empty) •,st(•, ­2),•
51 updP­owise st('S1, 10),st('S2, ­2),(empty).Set{Stock} •,st(•, ­2),•
52 toBnf st('S1, 10),st('S2, ­2) •,st(•, ­2)
Total size: 4340 bytes 279 bytes
Reduction Rate: 94%
...
...
Fig. 3. Extended view of the computed trace slice after refuting the functional assertion of Ex-
ample 3.2 (trusted mode).
Example 3.4
Consider a simple Maude program whose signature consists of two unary operators, m and c,
and one commutative, binary operator f. The program includes a single equation m(X) = c(X).
Then, σ = (σ1,σ2) = ({X/%1},{Z/%1}) is an E-unifier for the terms t1 = f(m(X),0) and t2 =
f(0,c(Z)). The new, unification variable %1 is used to establish that X and Z represent the same
value, and it is the only common variable shared by t1σ1 and t2σ2.
Our repair technique is based on a two-phase algorithm that takes as input: (i) the last Maude
step t
r,σ ,w−→ t ′→∗∆t ′↓∆ of the execution trace that violates S{ϕ}, with r being λ => ρ if C, (ii) the
violated system assertion S{ϕ}, and iii) the bug position p in the last trace state t ′↓∆.
Phase 1 [Semantic unification of the failing assertion and rule]. First we E-unify the terms
t ′[ρ]w (that is, a more general version of t ′ = t[ρσ ]w that does not apply the substitution σ to the
reduced term) and t ′↓∆[S]p (that is, a more general version of t
′
↓∆ where the subterm at the bug
position p is replaced by the assertion pattern S itself) in order to relate the variables in the right-
hand side ρ of r with the variables that appear in the state template S. Since there may be several
E-unifiers, we just select an E-unifier (σρ ,σS) such that the bindings in σρ do not clash with
the bindings in the computed substitution σ . This is done by performing a standard consistency
check through the parallel composition of σρ and σ , which computes the most general unifier
(mgu) of the set of all the equations x = t that represent a binding x/t in either σρ or σ . If such
an mgu exists, σρ is consistent w.r.t. σ , and the corresponding E-unifier (σρ ,σS) is selected.
As a side note, observe that we cannot simply E-unify ρ with S because the state template
S could include operators that are not in ρ but in t ′, and, hence, the two terms could be not E-
unifiable and lead to no repair. This is the reason why we need to E-unify ρ and S within their
corresponding state contexts, that is, t ′[ρ]w and t ′↓∆[S]p.
Example 3.5
Consider a Maude program that contains the rewrite rule rl [r] f(X) => g(X) and no equa-
tions, together with the execution trace a & f(0) r−→ a & g(0) and the system assertion (a &
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g(Z)) {Z>0}, which is violated in the state a & g(0). Observe that there is no E-unifier between
the right-hand side g(X) of r and the state template a & g(Z), whereas the pair ({X/%1},{Z/%1})
is an E-unifier for the terms a & g(X) and a & g(Z), which include g(X) and a & g(Z) in
their corresponding state context. More importantly, the bindings in the computed E-unifier en-
force X and Z to bind the very same value. This suggests to us that we can achieve a repair by
forcing the rewrite rule argument X to inherit the constraints on Z.
Phase 2 [Strengthening the rule condition]. Given the computed E-unifier (σρ ,σS), first we
split σρ into two sets σrule and σnew such that σrule = {x/t ∈ σρ | x ∈Var(ρ)∧UnifVar(t) = /0},
and σnew =σρ \σrule. Note that σnew contains all those σρ bindings that introduce new unification
variables, while the bindings of σrule only use the original variables of ρ . Then, we replace the
faulty rule r with the following corrected rule whose condition is strengthened by adding a
constrained version (that is built by using σS and σrule) of the violated logic formula ϕ:
crl [rfix] : λσnew => ρσnew if Cσnew /\
(( ∧
x/t∈σrule
x== t
)
implies ϕσS
)
.
The corrected rule rfix is produced by instantiating the original rule r with the substitution σnew
that introduces in rfix the fresh variables generated during the unification process of Phase 1 and
by adding the instance ϕσS of the falsified logical formula ϕ . The variables of such an instance
are constrained via a logical implication whose premise is the conjunction of all the bindings x/t
in σrule interpreted as Boolean expressions x== t4 . In the case when σrule is empty, the logical
implication corresponds to (true implies ϕσS), and thus simply reduces to the term ϕσS.
Example 3.6
Consider a Maude program that includes the following rewrite rule r and equation e
crl [r] : f(X,Y) => c(2,g(X,Y)) if X =/= Y .
eq [e] : g(X,Y) = m(X,Y) .
and assume that the operator m is declared commutative. Let us consider the system assertion
c(2,m(Z,5)) {even(Z)}, where even(Z) checks if Z is an even natural number.
The execution trace f(5,3)
r,σ−→ c(2,g(5,3)) e−→ c(2,m(5,3)), with computed substitution
σ = {X/5,Y/3}, is erroneous since the formula even(Z) does not hold for the binding Z/3 that
is computed by matching modulo commutativity the state c(2,m(5,3)) in the assertion state
template c(2,m(Z,5)).
The repair proceeds by first performing Phase 1, which computes two E-unifiers of the terms
c(2,g(X,Y)) and c(2,m(Z,5)), namely,
(σρ1 ,σS1) = ({X/%1,Y/5},{Z/%1}) (σρ2 ,σS2) = ({X/5,Y/%1},{Z/%1})
Now, observe that the E-unifier (σρ1 ,σS1) is discarded since σρ1 is not consistent w.r.t. σ . Ac-
tually, there is no mgu of σρ1 and σ because of the clash between the bindings Y/5 ∈ σρ1 and
Y/3 ∈ σ . The E-unifier (σρ2 ,σS2) is consistent w.r.t. σ and thus is used to infer the repair in
Phase 2 of the algorithm.
Phase 2 generates the partition σρ2 = σrule∪σnew = {X/5}∪{Y/%1} and uses it together with
σS2 to yield the following corrected version of the rule r:
4 A binding x/t in σrule can always be interpreted as an executable, Boolean expression x == t, since all the variables
included in x/t appear in the rewrite rule as well and thus take concrete values when the rule is applied.
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crl [rfix] : f(X,%1) => c(2,g(X,%1)) if (X =/= %1 /\ (X == 5 implies even(%1)) .
Note that the generated condition of a repaired rule rfix might not be satisfiable, which makes
rfix not applicable. This is not bad since the non-applicability of the corrected rule prevents the
system from reaching the faulty state signaled by the assertion violation. This therefore has the
inherent effect of reducing the number of erroneous runs in the system, which is of primary
importance in the repair of critical systems as first advocated by (Logozzo and Ball 2012).
3.3 New Additional Analysis Features
The system functionality of ABETS has been extended by introducing the following, new addi-
tional features.
Trusted/Untrusted modes. ABETS encompasses two slicing modes: trusted and untrusted. In
trusted mode, Maude built-in operators are considered to be trusted (i.e., not to have bugs) and
are therefore ignored in the trace slice (See Figure 3), which further reduces its size. In untrusted
mode, all relevant operators are traced. The trusted mode is set to true by default and can be
switched to untrusted mode by choosing the Trace Information option in the main menu and
then clicking the Trusted/Untrusted mode button. To help the user compare the original, ex-
tended trace and the trace slice when they are shown side-by-side (e.g., in the table view), trusted
reduction steps (as well as duplicate states modulo axioms) are not omitted but are depicted in
light gray.
Fig. 4. Computation graph generated from ini-
tial state s0 of Example 3.3 (partial view).
Computation graph exploration. To help
identify traces of interest for asynchronous
checking, ABETS supports two different rep-
resentations of the computation space for
a given initial term: the (standard) tree
representation that is provided by default
and a novel graph representation of the
state space that can improve user’s un-
derstanding of the program behavior (see
Figure 4). It is possible to switch be-
tween the two representations by left-
clicking on any node of the tree or graph.
In the case when the user left-clicks on
a node in the graph, the topmost left-
most node in the tree that is associated
with the considered graph node is high-
lighted.
Trace querying and manipulation. This fea-
ture allows information of interest to be
searched in huge execution traces by under-
taking a query that specifies a template for the search (see Figure 5). This query is a filtering
pattern with wildcards that define irrelevant terms by means of the underscore character ( ) and
relevant terms by means of the question mark character (?). In addition, traces and trace slices can
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be manipulated using their meta-level representation to be exported to other Maude tools. The
meta-representation of terms can be visually displayed, which is particularly useful for the anal-
ysis of object-oriented computations where some object attributes can only be unambiguously
visualized in the meta-level (desugared) states.
×Query information
States where the query st(_,­ ?) was satisfied:
Once selected a state, you can refine the retrieved data below:
st('S1, 10),st('S2, -2)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Fig. 5. Result of the trace query st(_, - ?).
Several extra features, de-
scribed in (Alpuente et al.
2016), are: (i) an incremental
trace slicing capability that al-
lows the computed trace slices
to be further simplified by au-
tomatically applying backward
as well as forward trace slic-
ing w.r.t. user-provided slicing
criteria refinements (Alpuente
et al. 2015); (ii) a program slic-
ing feature for delivering pro-
gram fragments that include all
and only the rules/equations responsible for the detected error.
A starting guide that contains a typical analysis session with ABETS can be found at
http://safe-tools.dsic.upv.es/abets/quickstart.pdf.
4 Implementation Details and Optimizations
The architecture of ABETS consists of the following: (i) a Maude-based slicer and constraint-
checker core that can run at both Maude and Full Maude levels interchangeably; (ii) a scalable,
high-performance NoSQL database powered by MongoDB that endows the tool with memoiza-
tion capabilities in order to improve the response time for complex and recurrent executions; (iii)
a RESTful Web service written in Java that is executed by means of the Jersey JAX-RS API; and
(iv) an intuitive user interface that is based on AJAX technology and written in HTML5 canvas
and Javascript. ABETS contains about 3500 lines of Maude code, 1000 lines of C++ code, 1000
lines of Java code, and 3000 lines of Javascript code. The system has been (re-)implemented by
primarily focusing on its performance, including improvements for both the analysis and for the
input and output operations.
Analysis optimizations. One of the many features of ABETS is its ability to manipulate all
the relevant information regarding the application of equations, algebraic axioms, and built-
in operators at the meta-level, which is a feature that is not supported by Maude. We imple-
mented this extension in a new developer version of the Maude system called Mau-Dev (available
at http://safe-tools.dsic.upv.es/maudev) without affecting the efficiency of the latest
Maude 2.7 release. Also, to boost the system performance, the functions that are more frequently
used in ABETS have been reimplemented in C++ as new, highly efficient, built-in Mau-Dev
(meta-level) operations that are available at Mau-Dev’s website.
I/O optimizations. Maude’s efficient parser allows very large initial calls to be efficiently
parsed in just a few milliseconds. In contrast, Full Maude’s parser is entirely developed in Maude
itself; hence, its efficiency can be seriously penalized when dealing with mixfix operator defini-
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tions due to extensive backtracking. As a result, ABETS initial calls that contain large and com-
plex execution traces as arguments typically took some minutes to be loaded into our previous
system (Alpuente et al. 2016). We have overcome this drawback by dynamically creating a de-
voted module that defines unique placeholder terms that are subsequently reduced to the actual
arguments of the initial (Full Maude) call. For example, to encode a Full-Maude, source-level
representation of the state s2 of Example 3.3, ABETS defines the 0-ary operator aState:
op aState : -> String .
eq aState = "1 : (st(’S1,23), st(’S2,8)) | (tr(’T1,10), tr(’T2,20)) |
(ord(’O1,’T2,’S1,10,6,4,open), ord(’O2,’T1,’S2,12,4,3,close))" .
This greatly reduces the size of the initial Full-Maude call since it only contains the aState
placeholder but not the actual state data. These data are later brought back by applying the
aState equation. A similar encoding is used for user-defined assertions and execution traces
that are to be asynchronously checked.
The added module is loaded prior to starting the Full Maude’s execution loop (Clavel et al.
2007). Thus, by taking advantage of the ability of Full Maude to access previously loaded Maude
modules, the entire call can be parsed directly in Maude, except for its top-most operator.
The output of ABETS executions typically consists of a Maude term of sort String, repre-
sented in JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) format, that collects all the computed information
(e.g., the source-level and meta-level representation of the original trace and the trace slice, the
associated program slice that can be computed as described in (Alpuente et al. 2016), and tran-
sition information between subsequent trace states). This output string is later processed by the
ABETS front-end to offer a more friendly, visual representation. Since efficient output handling
is crucial not to penalize the overall performance of the system, (meta) string conversion has also
been implemented in C++.
Some experiments that highlight the efficiency gain of the optimized system w.r.t. (Alpuente
et al. 2016) are shown in Section 5.
5 Experimental evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the ABETS system, we introduced defects in several Maude
programs endowed with assertions and we used the system to detect assertion violations. We
benchmarked ABETS on the following collection of Maude programs, which are all available
and fully described within the ABETS Web platform: Bank model, a conditional Maude specifi-
cation that models a distributed banking system; Blocks World, a Maude encoding of the classical
AI planning problem that consists of setting one or more vertical stacks of blocks on a table using
a robotic arm; BRP, a Maude implementation of the Bounded Retransmission Protocol; Dekker, a
Maude specification of Dekker’s mutual exclusion algorithm; Maze, the nondeterministic Maude
specification of a maze game where multiple players walk, jump, or collide while trying to reach
a given exit point; Philosophers, a Maude specification of the classical Dijkstra concurrency
example; Rent-a-car (fm), a Full Maude program that models the logic of a distributed, object-
oriented, online car-rental store; Stock Exchange, the running example of this article; Stock Ex-
change (fm), a Full Maude, object-oriented version of the Stock Exchange example; Webmail,
a Maude specification of a rich webmail application that provides typical email management,
system administration capabilities, login/logout functionality, etc. ABETS automatically iden-
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tifies theories that do not require Full Maude capabilities so that the highest possible analysis
performance is achieved without incurring unnecessary costs.
Table 1. Synchronous assertion-checking performance analysis
Program TEx TExChk #Chk OV OV jlamp Tsynth Tfix TI/O Size Tε Size T •ε %Red.
Bank Model 17 101 2004 4.94 5.76 2 2 10 9.536 1.236 87%
Blocks World 19 37 509 0.95 2.16 1 1 2 0.279 0.046 84%
BRP 5 23 1002 3.6 4.6 1 2 9 0.792 0.269 67%
Dekker 40 98 1002 1.45 2.5 2 14 55 8.268 0.286 97%
Maze 128 409 7437 2.2 3 1 3 13 2.747 0.423 85%
Philosophers 12 36 811 2 2.92 1 3 47 5.244 1.990 62%
Rent-a-car (fm) 178 263 1503 0.48 0.52 5 9 247 5.507 0.115 98%
Stock Ex. 36 103 1503 1.86 2.58 3 12 263 46.423 4.153 91%
Stock Ex. (fm) 726 1310 2004 0.8 1.72 5 43 4688 195.397 20.862 89%
Webmail app 138 271 1002 0.96 1.99 9 20 541 133.460 7.823 94%
In our experiments, we evaluate both the effectiveness and the performance of ABETS by
(synchronously) checking each program against an assertional specification that contains at least
one failing assertion. This way, an erroneous execution trace Tε is delivered and subsequently
simplified into a trace slice T •ε w.r.t. slicing criteria that are automatically inferred. The experi-
ments were conducted on a PC with 3.3GHz Intel Xeon E5-1660 CPU with 64GB RAM.
Obviously, the slowdown of the entire checking process depends on the number of assertions
that are contained in the specification and particularly on the degree of instantiation of their asso-
ciated patterns. Patterns that are too general can result in a large number of (often) unprofitable
evaluations of the logic formulas involved since the number of possible matchings (modulo ax-
ioms) with the system’s states can grow quickly. The slowdown can also be affected by the
complexity of the predicates involved in the functional and system assertions to be checked.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Bank Model
Blocks World
BRP
Dekker
Maze
Philosophers
Rent-a-car (fm)
Stock Ex.
Stock Ex. (fm)
Webmail app
Ttotal Ttotal (jlamp)
Fig. 6. Total speedup with respect to (Alpuente et al. 2016).
Table 1 summarizes our re-
sults. The TEx and TExChk columns
measure the execution times (in
ms) with and without assertion
checking for traces that apply 500
rewrite rules (which expands to
8292 rewrites —i.e., rule, equa-
tion, built-in operator, and axiom
applications— on average). #Chk
represents the total number of as-
sertion checks performed when
assertion checking was enabled.
OV is the overhead, i.e., the ratio
= (TExChk−TEx)/TEx which indicates the relative slowdown due to assertion-checking. The re-
sults obtained are quite satisfactory and comparable with similar logic assertion checking frame-
works such as (Mera et al. 2009). The average overhead is 1.92, which is 69% of the average
value (2.78) of the overhead of (Alpuente et al. 2016) that are shown in column OV jlamp for the
very same benchmark programs.
The figures in the Tsynth and Tf ix columns respectively measure the times for synthesizing the
slicing criterion and for inferring the repairs (in ms). Our experiments show very small synthesis
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times for the slicing criteria that grow linearly with the size of the erroneous state. This is partic-
ularly evident in the case of Webmail App, whose states are quite large (about 2.5Kb, which is
20 times the size of the Stock Ex. states). The time for inferring the repairs is also a small portion
of the total execution time.
The trace slices that are automatically delivered by ABETS are evalutated by comparing the
size of the detected erroneous execution trace Tε (in kilobytes); the size of the sliced execution
trace T •ε (in kilobytes); and the derived reduction rate achieved (%Red.), which ranges from
98% to 62% with an average reduction rate of 85%. With regard to the time required to perform
the slicing, our implementation is quite time efficient despite the complex analyses and reasoning
modulo axioms performed underneath; the elapsed times are small even for very complex traces
and also scale linearly. For example, running the slicer for a typical 50Kb faulty trace delivered
by the analyzer
Finally, the generation, parsing, and input/output of traces (and trace slices) have been greatly
improved in the current version of ABETS. The input/output (I/O) times are shown in column
TI/O of Table 1 (in ms) for I/O data sizes that range from 15 Kb (in the case of the Blocks
program) to 7 Mb (in the case of the Stock Ex.(fm) program). This gives an average I/O cost
of 0.6 s, whereas in our previous tool the I/O operations took minutes.
The total speedups that we achieved w.r.t. our previous implementation (including checking,
slicing, and I/O costs) are represented in Figure 6, with an average speedup of 9.66 with respect
to (Alpuente et al. 2016).
6 Conclusion and Related Work
ABETS combines run-time assertion checking and automated (program and execution trace)
transformations for improving the debugging of programs that are written in (Full) Maude.
Assertions have been considered in (constraint) logic programming, functional programming,
and functional-logic programming (see (Mera et al. 2009; Chitil 2011; Antoy and Hanus 2012)
and references therein). However, we are not aware of any assertion-based, dynamic slicing sys-
tem that is comparable to ABETS for either declarative or imperative languages. Actually, none
of the correctness tools in the related literature integrate trace slicing and assertion-based reason-
ing to automatically identify, simplify, inspect, and repair faulty code and runs.
A detailed discussion of the literature related to this work can be found in (Alpuente et al. 2016;
Alpuente et al. 2014). Here, we focus on assertion-checking tools supporting logical reasoning
modulo axioms, which are the closest to our work.
In (Durán et al. 2014), the validator tool mOdCL is described that checks OCL assertions on
UML models encoded as Maude prototypes.
If a constraint is violated, the execution is aborted and an error is reported that signals the state
and the constraint involved. In contrast to ABETS, mOdCL does not simplify (either manually
or automatically) the execution trace that reaches the erroneous state or the program itself in any
way.
The (rewriting logic) semantic framework K (Ros¸u 2015) supports assertion-based analysis
and runtime verification based on Reachability Logic (RL), a particular class of first-order for-
mulas with equalityP⇒P ′, whereP (andP ′) consists of a (Boolean) term b and a constraint
ϕ over the logical variables of b (i.e., b∧ϕ). These formulas P specify those concrete config-
urations that match the algebraic structure of b and satisfy the constraint ϕ . They are used to
express (and reason about) static state properties, similarly to our system assertions S{ϕ}. As for
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our functional assertions I {ϕin}→O{ϕout}, they are quantifier-free and evaluated on equational
simplifications, while RL formulas assert more general properties on system computations and
are used for deductive and algorithmic verification.
A different semantic approach for automatic program repair that is based on abstract interpre-
tation can be found in (Logozzo and Ball 2012), which applies to .Net languages.
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